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Worldly imprecision
Michael E. Miller†
Physical theories often characterize their observables with real number preci-
sion. Many non-fundamental theories do so needlessly: they are more precise
than they need to be to capture the physical matters of fact about their
observables. A natural expectation is that a truly fundamental theory will
require its full precision in order to exhaustively capture all of the funda-
mental physical matters of fact. I argue against this expectation and I show
that we do not have good reason to expect that the standard of precision set
by successful theories, or even by a truly fundamental theory, will match the
granularity of the physical facts.
1. Introduction. Suppose you have been tasked with measuring the value
of my height at some particular instant in time. You might proceed by asking
me to stand up straight against a wall at that instant, making a mark just
above the top of my head with a very fine tipped pen, and measuring the
distance between the mark and the floor with a meter stick. Were you to do
this you would likely find that the mark on the wall falls between two mil-
limeter markings on your meter stick, say the seventh and eighth millimeter
markings between the 95th and 96th centimeter markings. Having already
measured one full length of the meter stick, you would come to the conclusion
that I am 1.957 ± 0.001 m tall.
The precision of this measurement can obviously be improved. If only one
additional decimal place of precision is required you could simply obtain a
rule with finer markings. With the aid of an electron microscope you could
determine the value with nine or ten decimal places of precision. In fact, on
first inspection it seems that the only limit to the precision with which my
height can be accurately determined is the resolution provided by currently
available technology. In order for the only limit on the precision to come from
such pragmatic factors, there must be a physical fact of the matter not just
about the tenth decimal place of my height but also about the nth decimal
place for any arbitrary n. If there is some level of precision beyond which
there is no longer such a physical matter of fact, that marks a principled,
not merely pragmatic, limit on the precision with which my height can be
measured.
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It turns out that there is such a principled limit, at least if we impose plau-
sible conditions on the semantics for the ordinary language term “height”. By
my height we plausibly mean the distance between the floor and the highest
point on my head, and so a measurement of my height is a measurement of
that distance. Consider the determination of the position of the highest point
on my head.1 Suppose we can all agree which cells are part of me and which
electrons are parts of those cells and which are not. Determining which of
those electrons happens to be the furthest from the floor at a given instant
requires exactly determining each of their positions at that instant. But this
is precisely the sort of thing that quantum mechanics indicates that there
will not be a physical matter of fact about because the top of my head is
a complicated superposition of many quantum mechanical particles.2 A real
number provides more precision than is required to exhaust the physical facts
about my height.
This conclusion tells against the expectation that there are only prag-
matic limitations to the precision with which quantities such as height can be
measured. One might think that this is a peculiarity arising from scientific
investigation of a term whose meaning is restricted to the realm of ordinary
language. This turns out not to be the case. The same phenomenon, a mis-
match between the standard of precision in our theories and the granularity
of the physical facts, is a commonplace feature of our physical theorizing.
Empirically successful theories can display such a mismatch, and I will argue
that fundamental theories can exhibit such a mismatch as well.
The argument proceeds as follows. In Section Two I argue that the mis-
match between the precision of our theories and the facts about the world
they are designed to capture can be found in many aspects of our physi-
cal theorizing. In the third section I consider how to identify the standard
of precision that is natural for a given theory. This discussion leads to the
articulation of a collection of distinct standards of precision, each of which
might be natural for some class of theories. In Section Four I consider how
to identify the granularity of a collection of physical facts that a theory is
designed to capture. This process relies on experimental observation, and I
identify general features of experimental practice which demonstrate that the
success of a theory at matching the observational evidence does not require
a match between the standard of precision in the theory and the granularity
of the physical facts. In the fifth section I consider the view that in order for
a theory to be fundamental, its standard of precision must match the granu-
larity of the fundamental physical facts. As in the case of empirical success,
1Issues similar to those that follow obviously also affect the determination of the position
of the floor, but this won’t be of consequence for my argument.
2I develop the argument for this claim in more detail in Section Two.
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I argue that fundamentality does not require such a match. The final section
contains concluding remarks.
2. Worldly Imprecision. I have argued that the physical facts concerning
height have a granularity less sharp than the standard of precision provided
by real numbers. Many find this observation surprising, which motivates
the following question: where does the expectation that one should be able
to make meaningful statements about my height with real number precision
come from? In this section I will argue that it is the practice of physics that
has led us to this expectation.
Consider, for example, the elementary physics problem of determining
the vertical displacement from equilibrium as a function of time y(t), of a
block of mass, m, suspended from a spring with spring constant, k. The
dynamics of classical mechanics holds that this displacement is determined
by the equation,
m
d2y(t)
dt2
= −ky(t), (1)
which is solved by,
y(t) = A cos(ωt+ φ) for ω =
√
k
m
. (2)
Note that once m and k are fixed, and A and φ are determined by the initial
conditions of the system at t0, this solution assigns a real number to the
value of the displacement around the equilibrium position for all times t.
As our theoretical representation of the displacement takes the form of a real
number, we are led naturally to expect that the physical matters of fact about
the actual displacement will come with a granularity that matches the real
numbers. However, as in the case of my height, consideration of the quantum
mechanical nature of the particles constituting the block show that there is
no physical matter of fact about the position of the edge of the block with
real number precision.
Suppose we define the position of the edge of the block to be the position
of the lowest electron constituting the block. Then on most interpretations
of quantum mechanics, that there is no real number fact about the position
is obvious from any one of a number of different observations, such as that
position measurements do not yield exact position eigenstates. Bohmian me-
chanics presents an apparent counterexample as it assigns definite positions
to each of the electrons in the complicated superposition that constitutes the
edge of the block. However, the measurement of any one of the electrons
instantaneously influences the positions of all of the others. As a result, any
attempt to determine whether or not a given electron is the lowest will affect
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the positions of all of the others, and thus there is not a unique, identifiable
lowest point, independent of how one goes about the measurement process.
At a certain level of resolution, there is simply no longer a physical matter of
fact for the measurement to track. Just as we found in the height case, the
theory is more precise than it needs to be to exhaust the physical matters of
fact about the displacement of the block. The facts about the world are im-
precise with respect to the natural standard of precision in the theory. Let’s
call this phenomenon worldly imprecision.
Instances of worldly imprecision are related to, but distinct from, failures
of a view that Teller has recently called measurement accuracy realism (Teller
2018). According to measurement accuracy realism, there is a fact of the mat-
ter about the exact physical value of measured quantities, and thus there is an
objective fact about the accuracy of any given measurement. Teller argues
that in many cases measurement accuracy realism is false, and there is no
objective fact concerning the accuracy of our measurements. He defends this
view by arguing that there is not a fact of the matter concerning the physical
value of the measured quantity. The failure of there to be such a fact results
from reference failure of the statements about the physical quantity, which in
turn result from the idealizations that go into our theoretical articulation of
the quantity. As Teller explains, “Accuracy realism fails because of reference
failure, and reference fails because of a fact that we too easily let drop out of
view: the ubiquitous idealizations of our theoretical accounts of the world”
(Teller 2018, p. 288).
The reference failure that Teller argues for is on full display in the case
of our spring. By modelling the displacement of the spring with Eq. (1),
we have adopted many idealizations. We have assumed, for example, that
the response of the spring is perfectly linear, even though any real spring will
have non-linearities in its response, however slight. We have also assumed that
the gravitational field in which the spring is oscillating is perfectly uniform,
even though the actual field is slightly stronger when the mass is closer to
the earth because of the 1/r2 form of the gravitational force law. And we
could, of course, go on.3 Reference failure ensues, according to Teller, because
deidealizing requires that we specify a run-away list of additional conditions.
The temperature of the room in which the spring is located will affect the
form that the non-linearities in its response will take. The exact form of
the non-uniformity in the gravitational field depends on the specific location
on the surface of the earth where the experiment takes place. The term
“the displacement of the block at time t” fails to refer because we have not
3Many of the idealizations tacitly adopted by modelling the spring with Eq. (1) give rise
to larger contributions to the displacement than those mentioned here. For reasons that
will become clear below, I have chosen to focus on small effects.
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sufficiently specified the conditions involved in the deidealizations to pick out
any one particular quantity with a determinate value. Teller is pessimistic
about the prospects for us ever being able to fully specify a sufficient set of
conditions to completely deidealize, and thus he thinks that reference failure
for quantities runs rampant and measurement accuracy realism generically
fails.
Cue the inevitable rejoinder. Perhaps we aren’t the kinds of agents that
can actually do it, but surely in principle it is possible to completely deide-
alize. After all, for a particular mass on a particular spring at a particular
time, there are facts of the matter about where they are located, the prevail-
ing conditions at that location, the material constitution of the mass and the
spring, and every other causally relevant factor for the determination of the
displacement of the block. The reference of “the displacement of the block
at time t” fails not because the displacement isn’t the kind of thing that can
have a determinate value, but rather because it is ambiguous between the
different exact values it takes on for different specifications of the causally
relevant conditions. What we mean by “the displacement of the block at
time t” is just the value that one would arrive at if they were actually able
to execute this process for the conditions that obtain when and where the
experiment is actually conducted.
I think that Teller is right to point out the importance of deidealization
in fixing the reference of statements picking out quantities and I share his
pessimism about our capability to completely deidealize. What I want to
emphasize is that not all idealizations behave the same with respect to the
determinacy of the reference of terms specifying quantities like “height” and
“the displacement of the block at time t”. There are idealizations that result
from neglecting small effects. These are the kinds of effects that the imagined
interlocutor of Teller is sure we can fill in, at least in principle. But there are
other idealizations whose role is to frame the problem. The perfectly localized
point masses and perfectly sharp edges of blocks of classical mechanics are
examples of idealizations of this second kind. These idealizations do not make
small, neglected contributions to the value of the quantity. Rather, they make
terms like “the displacement of the block at time t” the kind of quantity that
takes a real number value for the other deidealizations to correct the value
towards. Worldly imprecision occurs when reference fails due to idealizations
of this second kind. Even if we were the kinds of agents that could fix all
of the causally relevant conditions for fixing all of the classical mechanical
details in the first group, the reference of “the displacement of the block at
time t” would still fail, because of the framing idealizations in the second
group.
Suppose we begin to make more and more precise measurements of the
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displacement of the block as we did in the case of my height. Executing
the deidealizations of classical mechanical effects with large contributions be-
comes important first and then we can proceed to deidealizations that con-
tribute at the next level of precision. As we proceed, eventually we arrive at a
level of precision where the principled limits from instances of worldly impre-
cision become relevant. It is crucial to note that these limits can arise before
we have completed the process of deidealizing all of the relevant classical me-
chanical effects. The semantic difficulties with “top of my head” and “edge
of the block” arising because of their constitution from quantum mechanical
particles become relevant at a precision of approximately 10−11 m, the scale
of the Bohr radius.4 Many idealizations arising from classical mechanical ef-
fects will be relevant before we reach this level of precision and as such are
significant for the determinacy of the reference of “height” and “the displace-
ment of the block at time t”. Other classical mechanical effects give rise to
contributions right around the 10−11 m threshold. The non-uniformity of the
gravitational field close to the earth’s surface due to the 1/r2 form of the
force law provides an example.5 But some classical mechanical idealizations
give rise to smaller effects than the 10−11 m threshold at which the semantic
difficulties with “edge of the block” arise. The gravitational influence of Pluto
on the displacement of the block is likely one. The gravitational influence of
a speck of dust in the 10,087th most distant galaxy from ours certainly is.
Some classical mechanical effects are so small that the framing idealizations
that we rely on to pose the problem give out before they make a difference.
The phenomenon we have identified here is not a peculiarity of classical
mechanics and its treatment of position observables. Examples where other
classical mechanical observables exhibit worldly imprecision can be readily
constructed. The phenomenon we have identified here is also not a peculiar-
ity of the relationship between classical and quantum mechanics. Instances
of worldly imprecision also arise for observables in thermodynamics when
we consider limits arising from statistical mechanics, for classical electrody-
namics when we consider limits from quantum field theory, and as we will
see in detail in Section Four, they arise in quantum electrodynamics from
limitations coming from the Standard Model of particle physics. The basic
ingredients required for worldly imprecision to obtain occur throughout our
4The Bohr radius is the most likely distance between the electron and nucleus of a hydrogen
atom in its ground state. The current best measured value is rB = 5.29177210903(80)×
10−11 m. The exact standard of precision will depend on the particular material consti-
tution of the block as different materials can have significantly different surfaces.
5For reasonable values of the parameters in the problem, numerical evaluation of the effect
shows that it influences the displacement on the order of 10−9 m or 10−10 m over the
course of one period of oscillation.
-6-
physical theorizing. The framing idealizations in higher level theories give out
before the full precision of the characterization of the observables they give
matters. In many cases, there is more precision in the higher level theories
than is required to say everything that there is to say about their observables.
3. Standards of Precision. When worldly imprecision occurs, the follow-
ing condition fails to obtain:
Match: the standard of maximal precision in the theory matches
the granularity of the physical facts concerning the theory’s ob-
servables.
Of course, a given theory might employ one standard of maximal precision
for some of its observables, and a different standard for others. Match should
be read as requiring that the relevant standard matches the relevant facts in
each case. There are two ingredients that go into making precise what ought
to count as failures of Match; the standard of precision in the theory, and the
granularity of the physical facts. Before proceeding, it is worth thinking in
more detail about both of these ingredients.
The standard of precision of a given theory is determined by the mathe-
matical structure of the theory and the relations that the theory posits be-
tween its observables. Our classical mechanical treatment of the mass on a
spring, captured in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), stipulates a collection of relations
obtaining between the observables m, y, k, A, and φ. This collection of re-
lations establishes a standard of precision that is maximal for the theory. In
particular, by modelling the problem with Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), we tacitly
adopt the following standard of maximal precision:
MPR: A statement about a quantity Q is maximally precise if
and only if it ascribes a real number d ∈ R to that quantity.
Some ascriptions of values to quantities are less than maximally precise with
respect to this standard. For example, one can take the value of m to be
1/2 kg. This is an ascription of a rational number to m. We frequently
pass between the ascription m = 1/2 kg and the ascription m = 0.50¯ kg,
as they can be used interchangeably for the purposes of some mathematical
manipulations. But by taking m = 1/2 kg we typically mean something
different than m = 0.50¯ kg. In particular, by taking m = 1/2 kg, we typically
mean that m = 0.5d1d2 . . . kg and that the decimal places after the 5, d1, d2,
and so on, are uncertain. Understood in this way, the ascription m = 1/2 kg
is less precise than the MPR standard. Ascriptions of natural numbers, such
as m = 1 kg, are even less precise than ascriptions of rational numbers.
One can also make statements that are more precise than MPR. If a
theory ascribes hyperreal numbers to its observables, for example, then its
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statements are more precise than MPR. The hyperreal numbers,
∗R, contain
the real numbers as a subset and the order relation on the real numbers
is a subset of the order relation on the hyperreal numbers, establishing a
clear sense in which ascriptions of hyperreals to observables are more precise
than the standard of maximal precision set in MPR.
6 The real numbers
are used throughout our physical theorizing and for this reason, MPR might
seem to be the natural or perhaps even inevitable standard. But we can
make statements more precise than ascriptions of real numbers to quantities,
and we can also make statements that are less precise. This shows that the
standard of precision in a theory is a modelling choice that we make when
we develop the theory. We can cast theories with standards of precision more
sharp than MPR by allowing for ascriptions of hyperreals to quantities, and
we can cast theories with standards of precision less sharp than MPR by
restricting ascriptions of values to natural or rational numbers.7
The other ingredient in Match is the granularity of the facts about the
physical observables that the theory aims to capture. I will presuppose, as
I think is common in recent discussions of the metaphysics of quantity, that
there are physical facts about the values that quantities possess. This presup-
position commits us to some form of realism about quantities. In particular, it
seems to involve commitment to the view that quantitative properties exist.8
On this view, electrons really have properties like mass and charge, and there
are physical facts about the values of these properties. This in turn involves
commitment to the existence of an objective fact about how fine-grained the
properties are as well. If there is a fact about the value a physical quantity
takes, there are is an additional fact about the granularity of that value.
For Match to be satisfied, the standard of precision that we input into a
theory’s characterization of its observables must exactly agree with the gran-
ularity of the physical facts concerning those observables. Cases of worldly
imprecision amount to failures of Match because they involve situations where
the standard of precision that we input into the theory is more fine-grained
6A clear introduction to the hyperreal numbers can be found in (Keisler 2012).
7Natural numbers and rational numbers are also real numbers, so one might be tempted
to argue that the ascription of a natural or a rational number makes the standard of
maximal precision that of the real numbers. That would be a mistake. When we restrict
ascriptions of values to natural or rational numbers, there are less ascriptions possible
than there would be if we allowed for ascriptions of any arbitrary real number, not just
the real numbers that also happen to be naturals and rationals. This is the sense in which
the standards obtained by restricting to the naturals or the rationals are more coarse than
MPR.
8Realist views of quantities that exhibit this commitment can be found in (Byerly and
Lazara 1973; Swoyer 1987; Mundy 1987). This stands in tension with at least some forms
of operationalism and conventionalism about quantities. For helpful discussion, see (Tal
2017).
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than the physical facts about the observables that the theory provides an
account of. Consider a toy theory whose only statement is the following one:
“at time t, there are 12 books on my desk”. This is an ascription of natural
number to a quantity, and so the standard of maximal precision in the theory
is that of the natural numbers. If we suppose that there are only whole books
on my desk at any given time, then the granularity of the physical facts about
my books is correctly matched by the standard of precision in our toy theory,
and hence Match is satisfied. If we used a distinct toy theory consisting of
the statement “at time t, there are 12.0¯ books on my desk” to capture the
same collection of physical facts, then we have a failure of Match due to an
instance of worldly imprecision. By adding the additional decimal places we
have changed the standard of precision to MPR. But the additional decimal
places of precision in the new theory do not track anything present in the
physical situation. This is also what happens in the case of my height and
the spring.
Failures of Match need not result from instances of worldly imprecision,
though. To see this, suppose that the physical domain we are interested in
representing is one continuous spatial dimension. If the observables we are
interested in representing with our theory are the distances between the points
along this dimension, our theory will need to use the precision of the real
numbers in order to satisfy Match, no matter what system of units we work
in. But now suppose that the spatial dimension has a minimum length. If we
choose a system of units in which that minimum length takes a real number as
its value, then our theory will not satisfy Match. All of the physical distances
between the points are multiples of the minimum length, and hence the full
granularity of the physical facts can be matched with theoretical statements
that ascribe natural numbers to the distances. Similarly, we typically work in
a system of units where the value of the spin of an electron along a particular
direction is ±~/2, a real number. Here again, Match fails because of the
system of units we have chosen to work in, not because of worldly imprecision.
In several of these examples, we have stipulated what the facts about the
granularity of the physical observables are for the purposes of illustration.
But in the context of scientific investigation, this typically is not given to us
for free. Rather, the granularity of the physical facts is something that we set
out to discover about the world, as we did in the case of spin. The best tool we
have to discover such facts is to represent the domain in question theoretically
and determine whether or not our theory successfully represents the domain
in question by making observations of the domain. In the next section we will
consider how the success of a theory bears on the issues discussed above.
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4. Success and Precision. Scientific realists often reason from the success
of a theory to the reference of its theoretical terms, its approximate truth, and
to agreement between aspects of its structure and the structure of the world.
I have argued that the standard of precision that we input into a theory is
one element of its structure. So one might argue that because a theory is
successful, we are warranted in inferring that it satisfies Match. That is, one
might argue that the following principle is true:
Success: For a theory to be successful, the standard of maximal
precision in the theory must match the granularity of the physical
facts concerning the theory’s observables.
In this section I will argue that Success is false.
One reasonable metric for the success of a theory is how well it matches
the available empirical data. Our classical mechanical treatment of the mass
on the spring is successful with respect to this metric. Measurements of the
displacement agree with the solution provided in Eq. (2) within the associated
uncertainties. If Success were true, this would lead us to believe that Match
was satisfied in this case. Since the standard of precision in the theory in
this case is MPR, this would mean that the granularity of the facts about the
displacement matches the precision of the real numbers. But the argument
given in Section 2 shows that this is not the case. Something goes wrong in
the inference from the success of a theory to the satisfaction of Match.
We can readily identify what has gone wrong: when we evaluate the match
between a theory and some empirical data, we often pass to a more coarse
standard of precision than the one involved in the statement of Match. There
are two basic features of the comparison between theory and experiment
that force us to adopt this more coarse standard. First, measurements have
associated uncertainties and so the measurement of an observable is typically
more coarse than the granularity of the facts about the observable. And
second, in order for Eq. (2) to tell us anything at all about y(t), we first need
to fix m, k, A, and φ. In order to do so we need to measure their values, and
these measurements will also have associated uncertainties. Because of these
uncertainties, the precision of the theoretically determined value for y(t) will
not be maximal with respect to MPR. The comparison between the measured
and theoretical values thus involves a standard of precision less sharp than the
one that is maximal for the theory. This is what goes wrong in the inference
from success to the satisfaction of Match. The agreement between theory
and observation that counts as the success of the theory occurs at a level of
precision more coarse than the one that is maximal for the theory, and hence
the one relevant to Match.
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The two basic features of comparison between theory and experiment lead-
ing to this conclusion are not particular to the case of the spring. They are
generic features of scientific practice. Consider the comparison between the-
ory and experiment in the case of the anomalous electron magnetic moment,
an observable that functions as a high precision test of quantum electrody-
namics. The electron’s magnetic moment is a property of electrons when
they are exposed to an external magnetic field. In this case, the current best
theoretical and measured values are as follows:9
ae (theory) = 0.00115965218178(77) (3)
ae (experiment) = 0.00115965218073(28) (4)
Agreement between theory and experiment to twelve decimal places is one
of the highest precision successes that has been achieved in the history of
our physical theorizing. But as in the case of the spring, we have passed
to a standard of precision much more coarse than the one that comes along
naturally with the theory in this case. Again we have a case where the testing
and confirmation of theories that ensures us they are successful is more coarse
than the one involved in Match, and so once again we have a failure of Success.
The uncertainty associated with the experimental value of ae depends
on the details of the technique used to conduct the measurement. In the
first measurement revealing a non-zero value of ae,
10 the uncertainty was
in the fifth decimal place, and in the current best value it is uncertain in
the 12th decimal place, a rate of improvement of approximately one order
of magnitude per decade. The precision of the theoretical value has also
improved over time, roughly keeping pace with the measured value. It is
determined by perturbative calculations in quantum electrodynamics and as
such individual orders of perturbation theory must be calculated and then
summed to determine the theoretical value. This evaluation gives terms that
decrease in magnitude as one proceeds to higher orders of perturbation theory.
The complexity of the calculation also increases with increasing order, and the
current state of the art allows for the calculation of five orders of perturbation
theory which are summed to yield the theoretical value.
This process of perturbative evaluation leads to a number of sources of
uncertainty in the theoretical value. While the integrals contributing to the
first three orders of perturbation theory can be treated analytically, at fourth
9The theoretical value reported here is the one reported in (Aoyama, Hayakawa, Kinoshita,
and Nio 2012), and the experimental value is from (Hanneke, Fogwell, and Gabrielse 2008).
Helpful discussion of the details of the theoretical calculations and the measurements of
these values can be found in (Koberinski and Smeenk forthcoming).
10(Kusch and Foley 1948)
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and fifth order the integrals become more complicated and some require nu-
merical evaluation, which introduces uncertainty in the resulting value. The
perturbation series is an expansion in powers of the fine-structure constant
and so in order to determine the theoretical value of ae we need to input
the measured value into the calculation, just as we needed to input mea-
sured values of quantities like the mass and the spring constant in the case
of the spring. The uncertainty associated with the measured value of the
fine structure constant is in fact the dominant uncertainty in the current best
theoretically determined value of ae. These limitations on the precision of the
theoretical value are pragmatic. With more computing power, the numerical
error from fourth and fifth order could be reduced, and perhaps eventually
the contributions from sixth order will be determined. And of course, the
fine-structure constant will eventually be measured with even more precision.
But there are also principled limitations to the precision of the theoretical
determination of ae. Quantum electrodynamics is expected to contain a Lan-
dau pole – a finite energy scale at which the renormalized coupling becomes
infinite – and for this reason it is best understood as an effective field theory.
Treating a quantum field theory as an effective field theory results in limits
on the precision with which it characterizes its observables. In this case, the
limitation is an exceedingly small one, far beyond the level of precision with
which the success of the theory is demonstrated. A second principled limit to
the theoretical value comes from the perturbative evaluation used to deter-
mine the value of ae. Terms early in the expansion get smaller in magnitude
with increasing order. However, this pattern is eventually expected to stop,
with the terms eventually growing in magnitude with the result that the sum
of the infinite collection of terms diverges. To obtain a finite result, the series
must be truncated at some finite order of perturbation theory.11 These effects
yield principled limits to the value of ae in quantum electrodynamics, though
they are very small compared to the current precision frontier.
There are other contributions to the anomalous electron magnetic moment
that are external to quantum electrodynamics. This theory was originally
developed to describe the coupling between the photon field and the electron
field, and can be generalized to include the coupling of the photon field to
the muon and tauon fields as well. Eventually it was realized that some of
these fields also couple to other fields in the Standard Model and experience
the strong and weak nuclear interactions as well as electromagnetism. These
couplings give rise to weak and hadronic processes that give small, but non-
11See (Fraser 2018) and (Blinded for Review) for further discussion.
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zero contributions to ae:
12
ae (weak) = 0.00000000000002973(52) (5)
ae (hadronic) = 0.000000000001685(22) (6)
The hadronic contribution, which is slightly larger than the weak contribu-
tion, is reflected in the theoretical uncertainty of the value reported in Eq.
(3).13
The observation that there are hadronic and weak contributions to ae is
sufficient to show that quantum electrodynamics exhibits worldly imprecision.
When we treat the problem of determining ae theoretically in quantum elec-
trodynamics, we make both of the kinds idealizations that we found operative
in the spring case. First, there are the higher order terms of perturbation the-
ory that are neglected when the perturbation series is truncated at a given
order. By neglecting these terms, we do not include transitions in the fields
that are part of quantum electrodynamics and which contribute non-trivially
to ae. To deidealize, additional orders of perturbation theory must be calcu-
lated and added to the value.
But there are also the idealizations of the second kind that are involved
in posing the problem. In this case, the structural idealization is that the
electron magnetic moment comes from the coupling of the electron field to
the photon field alone. This idealization is the analog of the assumption that
the block has a boundary that can be viewed as arbitrarily sharp. That is to
say, the anomalous electron magnetic moment of an electron field that only
couples to the photon field is like a block with an edge that can be made
arbitrarily sharp. There is no such block, or set of coupled fields in the world.
In the world the anomalous electron magnetic moment comes from an electron
field that couples to a W± and Z0 fields as well as the Higgs field. In this
case the idealization makes no difference for the first 10 decimal places of ae,
but then the weak and hadronic couplings become relevant. Beyond the level
of precision where these couplings become relevant, there is simply no longer
a physical fact about the value of the anomalous electron magnetic moment
from the coupling of the electron field to the photon field alone. Quantum
electrodynamics is more precise than it needs to be to say everything that
there is to say about its observables. One can continue calculating orders of
12These values are reported in (Mohr, Newell, and Taylor 2016).
13There is also a contribution from the coupling of the electron field to the Higgs field,
though this is smaller than the leading order weak and hadronic contributions. Many
scenarios for physics beyond the Standard Model would make small additional contri-
butions to ae, making discrepancies between the best theoretical and measured values a
potential signal of new physics.
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QED perturbation theory, but eventually this becomes like calculating the
gravitational influence of the speck of dust in the 10,087th galaxy over on our
spring. The framing of the problem has already given out by the time these
effects become relevant. The boundary giving rise to worldly imprecision
makes it the case that corrections from the effective nature of QED, and the
divergent nature of its perturbative expansion, fall beyond the limit of worldly
imprecision.
For a theory to be successful, it need not satisfy Match. We have seen
that in the demonstration that a theory is successful, we pass to a different
standard of precision than the one involved in Match. Our measurements are
less sharp than the granularity of the facts about the world they reveal. And
the processes used to get theoretical values out of our theories necessitate a
retreat to a more coarse standard of precision than what is maximal in the
theory. If one wants to argue in favor of Match, they need a different strategy.
In the next section, I will consider what I think is the last resort for defenders
of Match.
5. Fundamentality and Precision. I have argued that the facts about
the world are imprecise with respect to the standards of precision set by
many of our physical theories. In each case where I have argued that worldly
imprecision obtains, I did so by appealing to limitations arising from a more
fundamental theory. In the case of classical mechanics, I appealed to quantum
mechanics. In the case of thermodynamics, I appealed to statistical mechan-
ics. And in the case of quantum electrodynamics I appealed to the Standard
Model. A natural thought when presented with this collection of observa-
tions is that if we had a truly fundamental theory, a theory that exhaustively
characterized a complete minimal basis for everything that there is,14 then it
would not exhibit the phenomenon of worldly imprecision. In other words,
one might expect that the following principle is true:
Fundamental: For a theory to be fundamental, the standard of
maximal precision in the theory must match the granularity of
the physical facts concerning the theory’s observables.
Like Success, I think that Fundamental is false. In order to show that Fun-
damental is false, it will be helpful to restate it in the following equivalent
form:
Fundamental: For a theory to be fundamental, (i) the standard
of maximal precision in the theory must be at least as sharp as
14I will proceed with this intuitive, but admittedly contentious, understanding of funda-
mentality. Whether or not the arguments below depend on one’s particular account of
fundamentality is not a question I will pursue in this paper, though it merits further
investigation.
-14-
the granularity of the physical facts concerning the theory’s ob-
servables, and (ii) the granularity of the physical facts concerning
the theory’s observables must be at least as sharp as the standard
of maximal precision in the theory.
This is equivalent to the first statement of Fundamental because (i) and (ii)
are both satisfied if and only if Match is satisfied.
First consider clause (i). It holds that in order for a theory to be fun-
damental, its statements about its observables must be at least as sharp as
the granularity of the facts about those observables. This, I claim, is true.
The domain of a fundamental theory is the collection of fundamental physical
facts. If a theory’s statements about the fundamental physical facts are less
precise than the granularity of those facts, then there are more precise truth-
ful statements to make about the fundamental physical quantities. When this
is the case, the theory fails to be complete, and hence fails to be fundamental.
So clause (i) is a reasonable condition on fundamentality.
Now consider clause (ii). It holds that in order for a theory to be funda-
mental, the granularity of the facts about its observables must be at least as
sharp as its statements about its observables. Unlike clause (i), this is not a
reasonable condition on fundamentality. To see this, suppose that it doesn’t
obtain. Then the maximally precise statements of the theory are more precise
than the fundamental physical facts. But this doesn’t tell against the com-
pleteness of the theory. Rather, it means that the theory is more precise than
it needs to be to say everything that there is to say about the fundamental
physical facts: a theory about the fundamental level satisfying (i) but not
(ii) exhibits worldly imprecision. But in this case, the worldly imprecision
does not come from limitations from some more fundamental theory. The
fundamental physical facts simply are less sharp than the maximally precise
statements of the theory.
To put the point a different way, clause (ii) is not about the completeness
of the theory, but rather how concise the theory is in its characterization of
its observables. When clause (ii) fails to obtain, some of the structure in
the theory, some of its precision, is surplus to representational requirements.
To insist that clause (ii) is necessary for a theory to be fundamental is to
insist that a fundamental theory contains no surplus structure of a particular
kind. But we use theories with different kinds of surplus structure all of the
time, and no one ever complains that makes such theories non-fundamental.
The surplus structure at issue in this case, surplus precision, is admittedly
somewhat different than the standard cases, so it is perhaps worth illustrating
with a concrete example.
Consider a candidate fundamental theory which includes as one of its ob-
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servables the mass of the electron, me. Suppose that the electron mass is
in fact one of world’s fundamental physical properties, and that the natural
standard of maximal precision for me in our candidate fundamental theory is
MPR. The principle Fundamental says that for this theory to be genuinely
fundamental, two things must obtain. First, it must be the case that the
granularity of the physical facts about me are not more sharp than MPR.
So long as the physical matters of fact do not have the granularity of the
hyperreals, or some other granularity sharper than MPR, this first condition
will be satisfied. Second, Fundamental says that in order for our theory to
be genuinely fundamental it must be the case that the standard of maximal
precision in the theory is not more sharp than the granularity of the physical
facts about me. Since we are supposing that the standard of maximal preci-
sion in the theory is MPR, in order for this second condition to obtain, there
must be physical matters of fact about the 50th decimal place of me and the
10500th decimal place, and more generally, dN for arbitrarily large values of
N :
me = d0.d1d2d3 . . . d1050 . . . d10500 . . . dN . . . .
If we deny that clause (ii) of Fundamental is necessary for a theory to
be fundamental, things come out differently. Of course, since we are still
committed to clause (i), it will still need to be the case that the granularity
of the physical facts about me are not more sharp than MPR. If they were,
the theory would fail to be complete, and as a result, it would fail to be
fundamental. But when we deny that (ii) is necessary for a theory to be fun-
damental, we open the possibility that even though the standard of precision
in the theory is MPR, the granularity of the facts about me are less sharp
than this standard. That is, our theory might be fundamental even though
there are physical facts about me up to some decimal dW and no fact about
the subsequent decimal places:15
me = d0.d1d2d3 . . . d1050 . . . d10500 . . . dW . . . .
This is what happens in the other cases of worldly imprecision introduced
above. Our theories assign real numbers to their observables, and at some
point in the decimal expansion, the subsequent decimal places cease to give
us any additional information about the physical matters of fact concerning
the observable in question. The argument of this section has shown that the
same thing is possible even in a truly fundamental theory. Why should the
failure of there to be a physical fact about the 10500th decimal place of me
15Where this dW occurs in the expansion will depend on the system of units in which one
chooses to work. But if there is such a dW in some system of units, then there will be
one in every system of units which is a rescaling of the first.
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be taken to tell against the fundamentality of a theory that assigns a real
number to me? I just can’t see any good reason. There is nothing about the
notion of fundamentality that requires it.
6. Conclusion. We are accustomed to thinking that some aspects of a
theory structurally correspond to aspects of the world itself. We are similarly
accustomed to thinking that some aspects of a theory are surplus and do not
correspond to structural aspects of reality. Though not frequently thought
of in this way, the standard of maximal precision that we adopt in a theory
is one aspect of a theory’s structure. Once this is realized, we can consider
whether or not we have good reason to expect that Match is satisfied. I have
argued that the demonstration that a theory is successful does not typically
bear on whether Match is satisfied or not. I have given positive reason to
doubt that it is satisfied in some of our non-fundamental theories, and that a
move to a fundamental theory does not provide grounds to think the situation
will be any different in that context.
Edward Purcell once quipped that “There’s not enough carbon in the
universe to print out the value of one classical variable” where by a classical
variable he meant a variable with maximal precision in the sense of MPR
(Rabi et al. 1985, p. 48). Considerations of the sort Purcell suggests serve to
illustrate just how far removed real number precision is from our epistemic
practices. When we ascribe real number precision to physical quantities we
are using an exceptionally rich structure. Fundamental physical facts might
come structured so richly, but for all we know, they do not. For this reason, it
strikes me as well worth considering the possibility that much of the structure
that we employ when we ascribe real numbers to quantities is in fact surplus
structure.
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